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Barnett and Block (2008) establish that not only are fractional reserve demand deposits 
fraudulent and create an Austrian Business Cycle (ABC), but that a certain type of 
mismatching between time deposits and the period for which the depository institution re-
lends the deposited funds (banks or other financial intermediaries “borrowing short and 
lending long”) are also contrary to libertarian law. The question we address in the present 
paper is whether or not this type of disconnect between the period for which the ultimate 
lender committed funds and the ultimate borrower gained possession thereof  also 
necessarily start an Austrian Business Cycle.  Even though this does not constitute an 





The essence of Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) is as follows.  A 
reduction in interest rates below what they would be in truly free markets, as 
a result of monetary inflation causes2 an unsustainable boom.  The boom 
consists in a misallocation of resources such that production is not as fully 
aligned with consumers’ inter temporal preferences as they otherwise would 
be. The boom either ends in crisis that takes either the form of a 
hyperinflation that destroys the monetary system or that of credit 
contraction.  The crisis is followed by a bust during which resources are 
reallocated to their appropriate uses.  The critical part of ABCT is the 
unsustainable, inter temporal, misallocation of resources set off by the initial 
interference with interest rates. 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank Laura Davidson for editorial assistance. 
2 Monetary inflation herein refers to any increase in bank notes (or other currency) or 
demand deposits that are not fully backed by the relevant monetary commodity.  Of 
course, in a pure fiat money economy any increase of such artifacts constitutes monetary 
inflation. 




This paper considers three different, but interrelated, aspects of ABCT − 
fiat money, fractional-reserve banking and intermediation, and “real 
liquidity” − in order to come to a more complete understanding of the 
reality that is the concern of the theory:  As can be seen in table 1, 
fractional-reserve banking,3 to include both demand deposits and/or 





 Fractional-reserve bank 
(demand) deposits &/or 
banknotes 
100%-reserve banking 









Section 2 is devoted to an explication of financial intermediation, and its 
relation to the ABCT. The purpose of section 3 is to bring dealing into this 
analysis. Section 4’s burden is to consider credit risk versus (financial) 
liquidity risk. In section 5 we contrast financial and real liquidity and in 
section 6 relate financial intermediation and ABC. Section 7 asks “Can 
fraudulent time deposits lead to an Austrian Business Cycle?” we answer in 
the affirmative. We conclude in section 8. 
 
 
                                                 
 
3 Fractional-reserve banking is herein taken to refer to the time-carry trade, more 
broadly; i.e., it is a specific form of the carry trade. 
4 In such conditions, a boom may be both of very lengthy duration and great magnitude, 
before it is brought to a halt by its attendant crisis.  
5 In cases such as this, the period before the onset of the crisis is almost certain to be 
shorter, and the magnitude smaller, than in that of the case of footnote 3, supra. This is 
because a commodity money, even under fractional reserve banking (frb), serves as a 
leash, or a check, upon the ability of the banks, central or otherwise, to expand money. 
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2. Financial Intermediation 
 
This brings us to the matter of finance.  Let us divide 
people/households/businesses into two groups: surplus units, hereinafter A, 
and deficit units, hereinafter C.6  An A is one that controls more resources 
than it cares to at a particular point in time, whereas a C controls fewer.  
Assuming that the excess resources7 take the form of currency, but 
disregarding its form,8 let us examine the (generic) ways in which the 
transfer may take place.   
A may either buy an equity stake9 in C, or may become creditors by 
lending the excess resources directly to D.  In either case in so doing a broker 
may be used, but he, qua broker, “merely” brings the buyer and seller or 
borrower and lender together for a fee.10  However, brokerage is not the only 
form of intermediation.  For our purposes, the intermediation process may 
be thought of as a dichotomy: brokerage and dealing.11  Dealing involves 
intermediaries inserting themselves between A and C such that they acquire 
title to A’s excess currency and then divest the excess currency so acquired 
to C under a new title.  Often, multiple dealers intermediate between the A 
that provide(s), and the C that ultimately acquire(s) the excess currency.  
Only dealing is relevant for business cycles; brokerage is not.  Moreover, only 
dealing involving credit is relevant.12  Consequently, hereinafter we consider 
only dealing in credit. 
 
                                                 
 
6 A and C refer, as appropriate, either to individual units or to multiple units. 
7 I assume that the excess resources are valuable, and therefore the disposition is not by 
abandonment. 
8 What “forms” can currency take? We refer, here, to cash, whether governmental or 
private; e.g., U.S. Notes, U.S. Treasury Gold Certificates, National Bank Notes, U.S. 
Treasury Silver Certificates, Federal Reserve Notes, or U.S. coins. 
9 This option is not always available. 
10 Although A and C may find each other without outside assistance, in a modern society 
in which, literally, billions of people are interconnected economically and financially, this 
is not the normal course of events.  Rather, intermediaries facilitate the process.  
Specialization of labor is an important factor in this regard because specialization of 
knowledge and consequent economies scale reduce search costs. 
11 It is not uncommon for intermediaries to engage in both of these functions. 
12 Mutual and exchange-traded funds that invest in equities may be thought of as equity 
dealers. 







Dealers perform several functions.   
1) They facilitate economies of scale.  Rarely does the amount of excess 
resources that an individual A wishes to lend coincide exactly with the 
amount that an individual C wishes to borrow.  In cases where a C requires 
more funds than an individual A is willing to provide, the dealer aggregates 
funds from multiple A; in cases where an individual A is willing to provide 
more than any individual C requires, the dealer divides the funds among 
multiple C.  
2) Dealers also use their specialized knowledge to evaluate the credit risk 
of different C to determine which are credit worthy and at what interest rate 
spread.  Moreover, they monitor credit risk during the life of the loan to C 
using covenants to reduce credit risk; i.e., defaults. 
3) Because the titles dealers give to A are not directly linked to any 
specific C, A gain diversification of default risk. 
4) Dealers, by engaging in the inter temporal-carry trade; i.e., borrowing 
short and lending long, facilitate a structure of credit/liquidity in which C 
are able to borrow for longer periods and at lower rates of interest than 
would otherwise be possible.  In fact, this is the source of liquidity risk, in 
contradistinction to credit risk, in a society.  It is this function of dealers 
that is relevant for business cycles, and the one this paper considers. 
This paper, then, is concerned with the relation between financial 




4. Credit risk versus (financial) liquidity risk 
 
Consider the following. A lends money to B (think “bank”), who in turn 
lends it to C.  If B defaults on its obligations to A because C defaulted on its 
obligations to B, the problem is one of credit.  This type of problem can arise 
in any type of credit transaction.  However, if B defaults on its obligations to 
A, absent a default by C, then the problem is one of (financial) liquidity.  An 
example of the former case would be if A lends $100 to B for one year who in 
turn lends the $100 to C for one year, and C makes a bad investment and 
then has not the funds to repay B a year hence, who, as a consequence, has 
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not the funds to pay A, a year hence, both defaults are the result of credit 
problems.   
An example of the latter case would be if A lends $100 to B for one year, 
who in turn lends the $100 to C for two years, interest payable monthly, and 
principal payable at the end of the two year term.  With C performing 
strictly in accord with the terms of its note to B, at the end of one year A 
wants to be repaid the $100 rather than rolling the note over (with the 
interest rate adjusted in accord with then current market conditions).  If B is 
unable to borrow $100 from another A, say A′, to repay the first A, B 
defaults on its obligations to A, then the problem is one of (financial) 
liquidity.  Note that a liquidity problem can only arise if the term for which 
B has borrowed the funds from A is shorter than the term for which he lends 
the funds to C; i.e., in cases where B borrows short and lends long.  A 
liquidity problem cannot arise in a situation where B borrows long and lends 
short.   
To reiterate, in any credit transaction there is an ex ante risk that the 
debtor will be default on his obligation(s); i.e., be a credit risk.  For example, 
if A lends directly to C, it is possible C will default.  Or, in an intermediated 
transaction, A lends to B, the financial intermediary, and B lends to C.  
Again, in such cases, C may default on its obligation to B.  Whether or not B 
will, in turn, default upon its obligation to A depends upon a number of 
factors.  In any of these cases, if A does not receive his due, it is because the 
credit risk materialized.  The problem is one of credit not liquidity.  And, 
only in financially-intermediated-credit transactions involving inter 
temporal mismatches in which B's note13 to A matures before C's note to B, 
can a liquidity problem arise.  
 
 
5. Financial and real liquidity 
 
Liquidity is a characteristic of an asset that refers to the rapidity with which 
it can be redeployed, either directly or indirectly, into another, more 
valuable use, taking into account any change in value from the 
redeployment.  Virtually all definitions of liquidity treat it in terms of a 
monetary economy, and define it as the ability to convert an asset into 
money, rapidly, and without loss of pecuniary value.  Money, itself, then is 
                                                 
13 “Note” is used generically throughout to refer to any type of credit instrument. 




considered to be the most liquid of assets.14  However, some economists, 
including the present authors, consider liquidity a relevant concept in a 
barter economy, also.15    
In a monetary society, the liquidity of a financial asset means the ease 
with which it can be exchanged for money, the most liquid of all assets.  
There are two aspects to this: price and time.  The owner of an asset who 
wishes to sell it has in mind a (present) pecuniary value for it.  The longer it 
takes before he can sell it at that price or the greater the shortfall in the price 
he must accept for a quick sale, the less liquid it is to him.  Because different 
assets have different characteristics and are traded in markets with different 
characteristics, some are said to be more or less liquid than others.  
Obviously, liquidity is continuous in nature; moreover, it is subjective in 
nature and thus is not, and cannot be measured, objectively.  Note that the 
underlying aspect of liquidity is opportunity cost.  So with a financial asset 
the foregone alternative is the (subjective value of the) expected present 
value of the proceeds from a sale thereof.  And, the higher the opportunity 
cost, the greater the liquidity.   
Every society, monetary or based on barter, has a stock of real assets.  
Regarding real assets, the meaning of liquidity is ambiguous.  For, in these 
cases, the opportunity cost may not be the value from a trade, but rather the 
value from an alternative use; e.g., converting a building from apartments to 
condominiums or a warehouse to apartments.  Therefore, liquidity has 
meaning even in a barter economy and refers to how quickly the value of a 
real asset may be realized.16  
At any point in time there exists within any society a structure of more 
and less durable goods that constitutes that society’s structure of production 
                                                 
 
14 This is not universally correct.  Even in a society with a fiat money, such as the U.S.A., 
there are multiple monies in the sense that a U.S. penny, a $1.00 Federal Reserve Note 
(FRN) and a $100.00 FRN are each money, but, nevertheless, different.  In that case a 
particular money may not be very liquid: try buying a new car with pennies or a can of 
Coca-Cola® with a $100.00 FRN. 
15 For example, Keynes (1936, 239-242).  Has a concept of liquidity in a “non-monetary” 
economy.  See footnote 15, infra.  
16 Keynes (1936, 240) has a different concept of the liquidity of real assets: “In [a ‘non-
monetary’] economy capital equipments will differ from one another … in the rapidity 
with which the wealth embodied in them can become ‘liquid’, in the sense of producing 
output, the proceeds of which can be re-embodied if desired in quite a different form.” 
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and consumption.17  Unless there is a significant, non-offsetting change in 
the individual preferences of the members of that society, including time 
preferences, or significant changes in technology that substantially increase 
the versatility of goods, the liquidity of the stock of real goods is relatively 
fixed in the short run.18, 19  However, the liquidity preferences of individuals 
in terms of the financial assets they own can be volatile in the (very) short 
run, and increase dramatically very quickly.  Keynes was, of course, correct 
when he said that that ‘everyone’ cannot increase their liquidity 
simultaneously (1936, 160). He also held that the attempt to do so is very 
disruptive to financial markets with attendant consequences for the real 
economy.   But this latter claim is only true when market flexibility is 
abrogated by government regulations that render price and wage alterations 
                                                 
17 Orthodox Austrian Economics concerns itself only with the structure of production, 
although see Hayek (1935, 11, 54), Hayek  (1932, 241, n2), Hayek (1978, 212-213) and 
Garrison (2001, 47-49). 
18 Although liquidity is subjective, it is safe to say that in general a pickup truck is more 
liquid than a locomotive, as it can more readily be shifted to alternative uses.  Similarly 
for hand-tools compared to oil tankers.  Thus a change in technology that would 
substantially increase the versatility of locomotives or oil tankers would increase the 
liquidity of the society whose members owned these capital goods.  However, the 
structure of assets, both capital goods and durable consumers’ goods, in a society was/is 
designed to produce a stream of consumers’ goods, including services, that is in accord 
with the preferences, including the time (and liquidity) preferences, of the members of 
that society.  If peoples’ preferences change in non-offsetting ways then the current 
structure of assets will be less well suited to producing the newly preferred consumers’ 
goods.  Therefore, the asset structure of that society will be less liquid in that it will not 
be able to convert resources into the newly preferred consumers’ goods as quickly and 
with as much value as it was previously able to convert resources into the consumers’ 
goods preferred prior to the changes in preferences.  Regarding time preferences, this 
same analysis holds for non-offsetting increases in time preferences, and for non-offsetting 
decreases in time preferences.  However, this does not hold in the latter case if the 
preferences shift only with respect to the timing of the preferences for consumers’ goods 
and not for the types thereof, if such preference changes are with respect to durable 
consumers that that can be stored at zero resource cost for the entire period of time by 
which the time preferences have changed.  
19 Generally speaking, poor societies’ structures of goods are probably less liquid than 
those of wealthier economies.  In modern societies, there are opposing forces at work re 
liquidity of real goods.  In some cases productivity is best promoted by highly specialized 
machines; e.g., elevators; whereas in others it is best promoted by highly versatile 
machines; e.g., pickup trucks.   
 




more difficult.  Moreover, there is no reason to think that such behavior 
would occur in a free market economy.    
 
 
6. Financial intermediation and ABC 
 
Austrians have long understood that lending new (fiat) money into existence 
via a fractional-reserve banking system results in or causes a misallocation of 
resources.  It does so by forcing interest rates below the level they otherwise 
would have been.  This induces an increase in borrowing that is used to 
unwittingly20 malinvest.  At the same time it leads to a reduction in 
voluntary saving.  In consequence, the necessary equality of investment and 
saving is brought about by forced saving that fills the gap between the 
increased investment and the decreased voluntary saving.  That is, the 
increased investment in the form of malinvestment is the flip side of the 
increased saving in the form of forced saving or: malinvestment ≡ forced 
saving (Block and Barnett, 2007). 
However, fractional-reserve banking is but a special case of the more 
general inter temporal-carry trade.  In the general case, B borrows money 
from A for a fixed, non-zero period of time and then re-lends the funds to C 
for a longer period of time, whereas in the case of fractional-reserve banking 
B borrows money from A and agrees to repay A instantaneously on demand 
by A, and then re-lends the funds to C for a longer period of time.  In both 
cases, the loan to C is for a greater period than the loan to B.  In either the 
general or the special case, a fractional-reserve bank, B must repay A before 
he, B, is repaid by C.  
The normal case is that interest rates on shorter-term loans are lower 
than those on longer-term loans, ceteris paribus.  The reasons for this are: 1) 
the default risk is greater on longer-term loans; and, 2) longer-term loans 
must bear a liquidity premium relative to shorter-term loans, as lenders face 
uncertainty as to when they will want to use the funds loaned, and the 
longer the period of the loan the greater the likelihood they would like to 
                                                 
20 Is it always “unwittingly?”  Or is it sometimes knowingly with the expectation of 
“front-running?”  For the view that, absent the full rational expectations model of 
perfect future knowledge (a logical contradiction, since we cannot know what we will 
know in the future, otherwise we would already know it), the misallocation can be 
“witting,” or made “wittingly,” see Block (2001) 
 
Crash and Carry 
 
463
have them back before the loan matures.  Consequently, the term-structure 
of interest rates is almost always an increasing function of time.  It is this 
spread between the lower, shorter-term rates at which the intermediary 
borrows and the higher, longer-term rates at which it lends, that provides 
the margin for intermediaries to cover their expenses and earn a profit. 
In reality, financial liquidity must be the same as real liquidity, just as 
saving must equal investment.  In either case they are but two different 
manifestations of the same underlying thing, the latter dealing with the 
allocation of resources and the former with the pecuniary valuation thereof; 
i.e., the former with prices and the latter with quantities. 
Although not deduced from an apodictic truth, it is quite clear that there 
is, in the aggregate, a conflict between people’s time preferences as lenders 
and as borrowers.  That is, they prefer (in the thymological sense)21 that the 
financial assets they buy be (much) more liquid than those that they sell. 
Were it not true, there would be no intertemporal carry trade. People who 
wanted to borrow long would find people who want lend long and people 
who want to borrow short would find people who want to lend short.  And, if 
intermediaries were used for matching purposes, only, the interest rate 
spread between that paid by B to borrow from A and then lend to C for the 
same time period would narrow to cover only the administrative expenses of 
the intermediation function, including a reasonable profit, and any perceived 
difference in credit risk between B and C.  It would not have to have a 
premium to cover liquidity risk.  Of course, that is a logical impossibility − it 
is like trying to square a circle.  Moreover, any attempt to do so is bound to 
cause frustration and waste scarce resources.22  And, yet, that is precisely 
what the inter temporal-carry trade attempts to do, with serious 
consequences for macroeconomic stability; i.e., it is the root cause of 
Austrian business cycles.  
Absent financial intermediaries, all credit would be direct between A and 
C.  There could be no inter temporal mismatch of the term-to-maturity of 
credit.  However, the presence of intermediaries facilitates such mismatches; 
                                                 
21 Another thymological, but not praxeological relationship in Austrian economics 
concerns that between wealth and time preference. They tend to be inversely related, but 
this is not a necessary association. See on this Block, Barnett and Salerno, 2006. 
 
22 Waste here is used in the Misesian sense; i.e., although as a science economics eschews 
value judgments, it is scientific to note that certain actions can not possibly achieve the 
ostensible end(s) thereof. 




indeed, makes them possible.  Now, A can lend funds for shorter periods and 
C can borrow those same funds for longer periods. The essence of our thesis is 
that the inter temporal-carry trade, whether of the fractional-reserve-
demand-deposit type or of the (improperly matched) time-deposit type, 
creates time ex nihilo; that is, it creates out of the thin air the period of time 
that constitutes the difference between the lending period of A and the 
borrowing period of C.  But the efforts to bring about this logical 
impossibility result in the misallocation of resources of the Austrian business 
cycle type.   
Were it not for intermediation, the voluntary interactions of A and C in 
the market-place would result in an increase in the average term-to-maturity 
of loans made by A and a decrease in the average term-to-maturity of loans 
received by D.  In fact, there would be, could be, no spread between them.23  
However, as C’s desired term-to-maturity decreased, they would not be 
willing to pay interest rates as high as for longer-term loans. And because 
A’s desired term-to-maturity increased they would not be willing to accept 
interest rates as low as for shorter term loans.  This would result in a 
decrease in forced saving and an increase in voluntary saving on the one 
hand and a fall in both investment and malinvestment.24   
Here, the relationship is a logical necessity.  It is important to remember 
that investment and saving have two dimensions, each: a quantity 
dimension, say $, and a time dimension, for example years.  The elimination 
of the time carry would eliminate both the forced saving and the 
malinvestment, which are but two different perspectives of the same 
phenomena.  However, as we state, supra, the average period of a loan by A 
would rise, increasing the time dimension of (voluntary) saving and thus 
escalating saving; and, the average period of a loan to C would decrease, 
reducing the time dimension of investment, and thus diminishing 
investment. Another way of looking at it is that absent the intermediary, 
both A and C would find that, on average, the terms they were offered in the 
credit markets were less desirable.  In order to clear the credit markets A 
                                                 
23 In reality, some intermediaries would continue to perform the other intermediary 
functions for which they would either have to have an interest rate spread or charge fees. 
24 Saving and investment have (at least) two dimensions: a quantity dimension and a 
time dimension.  Financial saving of $100 dollars for one year is less than financial saving 
of $100 for two years.  Therefore, voluntary saving can increase without the quantity 
increasing if the average term-to-maturity of loans increases.  
 
Crash and Carry 
 
465
would have to lend for longer terms and C would have to borrow for shorter 
terms than with the intermediaries’ services. These changes in the time 
dimensions would increase saving and decrease investment.  That is, with B 
in the middle A lent $1.00 for 1 year, at 5%, which is a saving/loan of $1.00-1 
year; whereas C borrowed the $1.00 for 2 years, at 10%, which is an  
investment/loan of $1.00-2 year.25  Without B, A would have lent $1.00 at 
7.5% to C for 1.5 years.  Both saving/loan and investment/loan would now 
be equal at $1.00-1.5 year.  That would be an increase in saving of $1.00-0.5 
year and a decrease in investment of the same amount.  Note that with B 
involved, forced saving of $1.00-0.5 year = malinvestment of $1.00-0.5 year.  
Why is that?  Because total investment must equal total saving.  And total 
investment, including malinvestment, with B involved, is $1-2year.  But 
total investment without B is $1.00-0.5 years.  Therefore, malinvestment 
equals $1.00-0.5 year and, as we know forced saving equals malinvestment.  
Q.E.D.      
This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that in addition to 
fractional-reserve (demand) banking, any mismatched inter temporal-
financial intermediation of the borrow short and lend long sort, causes 
resource misallocations, and if they are of sufficient magnitude (Block and 
Barnett, unpublished) an ABC. Put differently, even in a monetary/banking 
system based on gold with 100% reserves required against demand deposits, 
improperly matched (short lending, long borrowing) intertemporal-financial 
intermediation involving time deposits, would, if of substantial amount, give 
rise to Austrian type business cycles.   Neither fiat money nor fractional-
reserve banking are necessary for ABCs, although fractional-reserve-demand 







                                                 
25 In contradistinction to the International System of Units, these can not be combined 
into derived dimensions.  For example, in the equation for force, F = ma, a mass of 3kg 
accelerated at a rate of 2ms-2 = a mass of 2kg accelerated at a rate of 3ms-2 = 6n.  
However of a loan of $3.00 for 2 years is a quite different thing from a loan of $2.00 for 3 
years.  And, neither is equal to a loan of $6.00- for 1 year. 
   




7. Can fraudulent time deposits lead to an Austrian Business Cycle? Yes 
 
At first glance, one would suppose that mismatched time deposits26 cannot 
lead to an ABC.  Why not? Because they do not increase the amount of 
money in circulation, and mainstream Austrian Business Cycle Theory 
(ABCT) is predicated on precisely that as a causal antecedent.27  
However there is more than one way to skin a cat. When government 
creates additional money, by lending it into existence in a credit market,28 to 
be sure, this sets the stage for the ABC. But this is only a sufficient 
condition, not a necessary one. There is yet another roadway into the ABC: 
when banks or other financial intermediaries borrow short and lend long. 
In order to see this, let us suppose that there were no time deposit banks 
to serve as intermediaries, and borrowers and lenders had to deal with one 
another directly. Posit that there is a potential supplier of funds who is 
willing to do so for 3% per year for a two year loan, Mr. A; he wishes to lend 
“short.” Then, there is Mr. C, who would like the use of this amount for 
money for a period of 10 years; i.e., he wishes to borrow “long,” and is 
willing to offer 5%.29  If there were a mismatching time deposit bank in the 
picture, that would pretty much be the end of our little story: assuming C to 
be a good credit risk and the 200 basis points to be a sufficient spread to 
cover the intermediaries’ expenses and a reasonable profit. But there is not, 
so the only way A and C may be able to reach an agreement is by 
negotiating with each other.  
What happens then? Possibly, C raises his interest rate offer to, say, 7%; 
if this is insufficient, then to 9% or 11%.  Whereupon A, or another low time 
preference potential lender, takes the bait. Say, they settle at 9%.  Or, A 
offers to lend for say seven years at, say, 4% and C accepts the offer.  A is 
                                                 
26 Mismatched time deposits refers to the type of financial intermediation in which the 
financial intermediary “borrows short and lends long.” 
27 See on this Barnett and Block, 2005, 2006; Block, 2001;  Block and Garschina, 1996; 
Carilli and Dempster, 2001;  Garrison, 1994, 2001, 2004;  Garrison and Bellante, 1988;  
Hayek, 1935;  Mises, 1998;  Rothbard, 1993. 
28 In the U.S. this is done by the Federal Government's bastard child, the Federal Reserve 
System.  
29 We choose a higher interest rate for longer durations, since, ceteris paribus, there is a 
greater risk of non payment, as well as necessarily, greater loss of liquidity, which we 
assume is a positive benefit. 
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willing to extend the period of the loan for a higher rate and C is willing to 
borrow for a shorter period at a lower rate. 
But this means that interest rates for any loan of any given length of time 
will be higher than they otherwise would be in this scenario. Or, to take the 
obverse perspective, we can infer that upon the entry of the mismatched 
time deposit bank, interest rates for any loan of any given length of time will 
be lower than would otherwise prevail.30 However, lowering interest rates 






We full well realize that our thesis is not fully compatible with “classical” 
ABCT.31 There, fractional reserve banking is both necessary and sufficient to 
bring about the ABC. In our view, in contrast, FRB is only sufficient to this 
end. Another phenomenon, not unrelated to the first, is also sufficient 
(although not necessary): mismatched time deposits. These, too, as we have 
demonstrated, can artificially lower interest rates below levels that would 
otherwise occur. Because the ABC consists in the unsustainable, systematic 
misallocation of resources consequent on such artificially lower interest rates, 
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